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At the present time, intellectual historians, literary critics, political theorists, 
and scholars working in related fields are inclined to focus on ‘difference’, 
heterogeneity and hybridity rather than on ‘sameness’ or ‘equality’. The latter 
concepts tend to receive a bad press insofar as they are seen to ‘silence’ the 
voices of the ‘other’. Now, in many cases such criticism may be well deserved, 
and I have no quarrel with the emphasis on difference and the construction 
of otherness that has in many ways enriched our understanding of intellectual 
history. 
 However, it seems to me that many discussions of difference, 
otherness, and orientalism tacitly assume the validity of the abstract, 
universalist concept of equality that is today frequently relegated to the post-
modern limbo of ‘hegemonic, Western Enlightenment discourse’. One only 
has to ask innocent questions, such as ‘why is colonialism not a good thing?’ 
or ‘why is oppression bad?’, to expose the tacit assumption. Without a 
universalist concept of the equality of all human beings, the critique of 
‘othering’ simply loses its moral and political point. 
 This is of course not to say that we can simply pursue the business of 
intellectual history as if nothing happened. There may be no good reason to 
abandon the ‘canonized’ universalistic concepts, but there are certainly good 
reasons to re-examine them.1 The following essay is meant as a contribution 
to the re-examination of one particular universal concept. It seeks to do this 
by means of a historical inquiry. Its aim is to delineate the contours of a 
possible history of concepts and discourses of equality. 
 Why a historical approach? Because one way to ‘deconstruct’ 
seemingly timeless universals such as equality, liberty and reason is to write 
their history. The simple move of situating an abstract concept in the 
temporal flux of history divests it of its serene aura of immutability. If it is the 
historical, intellectual, political and social, context that confers meaning and 
point on a concept, it is only within that context that a given concept can 




1 Donald R. Kelley, ‘What is happening to the history of ideas’, Intellectual news. Review of the 
International Society for Intellectual History 1 (1996) 36-50, esp. 49. 




Is a history of equality possible? 
 
But there is a snag. The project of a rigorously contextual history of equality 
conjures up the spectre of historicism (in the old German sense of the term): 
how do we know that equality-concepts and equality-discourses in different 
historical periods and contexts are meaningfully related to one another? To 
steer clear of the historicist trap I propose to make three moves: two 
conceptual, and one historical. My first conceptual move takes a cue from 
Wittgenstein. Speaking about the nature of language, Wittgenstein says: Statt 
etwas anzugeben, was allem, was wir Sprache nennen, gemeinsam ist, sage 
ich, es ist diesen Erscheinungen garnicht Eines gemeinsam, weswegen wir für 
alle das gleiche Wort verwenden, -- sondern sie sind mit einander in vielen 
verschiedenen Weisen verwandt.’2 Likewise, we may postulate a ‘family 
relationship’ between equality-discourses and concepts in different languages, 
historical periods and contexts. We can recognize affinities and parallels: these 
words refer to situations and speech-acts that exhibit meaningful analogies, 
even if we cannot produce a clear-cut formal definition of equality that is 
applicable to all of them (wasn’t it Nietzsche who said that one can only 
define what has no history?). 
 Nonetheless, and this is my second conceptual move, some sort of a 
working definition may be useful. In mathematics, equality denotes identity 
(though, even in mathematics, this is not perfect sameness). In social life 
identity is obviously a non-starter: no two human beings or categories of 
human beings are identical. When Homer, in the Odyssey, tells us that all men 
must die, he is saying that they are similar in one respect.3 Moreover, mortality 
is considered significant by all men. So we can define equality in human 
society as culturally significant similarity. This has the further advantage that the 
qualifier ‘culturally significant’ takes in the representational nature of equality. 
However, a working definition is not more than a heuristic device. Stories 
may suggest similarity and equality without any explicit reference to them. 
When Herodotus recounts that ‘many cities that were once great have now 
become small’, he incites the powerful to reflect on the transience of 
greatness,4 one day, they may become just as vulnerable as the backwater 
towns they now look down on. Such stories, parables, maxims and 
                                                 
2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (Frankfurt a.M. 1967) 48 (italics in original). 
3 Odyssey, III, 236. Translated by: A.T. Murray (Cambridge Mass. and London 1998). 
4 Herodotus, I, 5. Translated by: A.D. Godley (Cambridge Mass. and London 1999). 




apophthegms have an ‘equality-effect’. The histories and books of wisdom of 
human civilizations are replete with such equality-effects. 
 My third move is historical. It focuses on the significance of traditions 
and canons. While agreeing with Quentin Skinner’s almost ‘orthodox’ critique 
of the anachronistic fallacy, inherent in the notion of the forerunner, I 
propose to focus attention on the other arrow of time: the one that points 
backward. Homer cannot be treated as a forerunner of Plato, but Plato 
certainly was an ‘after-runner’ of Homer because the latter stood at the centre 
of the canonical tradition in which Plato was educated and to which he 
reacted critically. The upshot is that, in so far as there is a continuity in 
intellectual history, it is enacted retro-actively. It cannot be otherwise, as 
Conal Condren has argued, for without some ‘canonical’ tradition we can 
hardly think at all.5 To the extent that later thinkers have consistently drawn 
on a select company of earlier thinkers, the canon of the history of political 
thought is self-validating, as Janet Coleman has recently contended.6 That 
does not mean however that it cannot, and should not, be criticized and 
amended, a point on which Coleman is rather less convincing but that is 
central to my project to write a history of equality.7 
 A history of equality may enable me to draw on canonical, as well as 
non-canonical thinkers, and to demonstrate that the non-canonical thinkers 
were frequently part of the (later forgotten) context of the canonical thinkers, 
so that their inclusion in the story will in many cases occasion a modification 
of our understanding of the canonical thinkers. I will use the large family of 
equality-words and discourses, and the equality-effects of stories, to construct 
a history that takes in processes of canonization and de-canonization. As a 
matter of fact, a history of equality cannot be written without including this 
dimension, for canonization is about inclusion and exclusion in intellectual 
history and, more importantly, in the practice of thinking and acting 
politically. To a large extent the canon therefore defines who are the 
legitimate and recognized political speakers in a given historical context. That 
is, it determines who are to be counted as ‘equals’ and who are not. 
 Why equality? I have already supplied a part of the answer above: it is 
probably the best candidate for subverting and rewriting the canon of political 
                                                 
5 Conal Condren, The status and appraisal of classical texts (Princeton 1985) 275-285. 
6 Janet Coleman, A history of political thought. From ancient Greece to early Christianity (Oxford and 
Malden Mass. 2000) 2. 
7 See my discussion of the canon in Siep Stuurman, ‘The canon of the history of political 
thought. Its critique and a proposed alternative’, History and theory 39 (2000) 147-166. 




thought that has traditionally privileged the concept of liberty. Furthermore, it 
is a notion that is applicable over a remarkably broad range of human 
activities. In the history of political thought as we (still) know it, equality 
usually makes its appearance in the setting of the ancient Greek city-state, in 
the context of the democratic self-government of free, male citizens. Viewed 
in a broader historical perspective, however, the notion of equality is not 
necessarily restricted to the arena of the democratic polis, or even to the 
political realm in the strict sense. There are other settings beside the 
government of the polis in which determinate categories of human persons 
might come to regard each other as ‘equals’. In the course of history people 
have advanced claims of equality along multiple dimensions and in disparate 
social settings: warfare, politics, work and the distribution of material goods, 
gender, ‘race’, religion, mythology, performance and excellence, to name the 
most conspicuous.8 
 To frame the following discussion, two further observations on the 
concept of equality may be useful. In the first place, equality is not an 
empirical concept. It does not refer directly to ‘material’ relations of equality 
among people. A non-theoretical, ‘naïve’ observer of social reality (assuming, 
for the sake of argument, that such an observer can exist) will ‘see’ inequality 
rather than equality, for inequality is, one might say, the basic stuff of social 
relations, the raw material of history. Equality is thus an abstract, discursive 
concept: people are not equal but they can be represented as equal. My 
leading question is: Under what circumstances, drawing on which available 
practices and languages, can such representations come about? 
 Finally, it is useful to distinguish between equality and egalitarianism. 
Egalitarianism denotes the conscious pursuit of some specific variety of 
equality, while discourses and concepts of equality refer to specific senses in 
which certain persons are deemed equal in particular respects. The relation 
between equality and egalitarianism is one of potentiality: concepts of equality 
are not necessarily egalitarian. On the other hand it is obvious that ideas of 
equality can easily spill over into egalitarian discourses. When somebody 
argues that ‘we’ are in some relevant sense equal to ‘them’, the existing 
hierarchical relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is questioned. 
                                                 
8 Extant discussions of the history of equality are largely confined to its role in politics sensu 
strictu, see e.g. Sanford A. Lakoff, Equality in political philosophy (Cambridge Mass. 1964); R. R. 
Palmer, ‘Equality’ in: Philip P. Wiener ed., Dictionary of the history of ideas, vol. 2 (New York 1973) 
138-148; Otto Dann, ‘Gleichheit’ in: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 2 (Stutgart 1975) 997-1046 
and Otto Dann, Gleichheit und Gleichberechtigung: das Gleichheitspostulat in der alteuropäischen Tradition 
und in Deutschland bis zum ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin 1980). 




Socio-cultural contexts of equality 
 
With this framework in mind we can now distinguish several socio-cultural 
settings in which discourses of equality can originate. These are defined in the 
broadest possible manner, so as to be applicable to a wide range of historical 
contexts, across periods and cultures. 
 1. The experience of mutual dependence. There are socio-political spaces in 
which people develop an enhanced sense of mutual dependence. This can 
give rise to weaker or stronger notions of equality among a restricted group of 
insiders. Examples of such spaces are: bands of warriors or migrants, 
seafarers, urban freemen, peasant villagers. The ‘insiders’ often have to carry 
on their business in a risky or hostile environment occasioning feelings of 
mutual dependence and solidarity. In such circumstances relations between 
leaders and followers tend to oscillate between autocratic and democratic 
solutions to the problems of collective action and leadership. 
 2. The frontier experience. This is in a sense the mirror image of the first 
case. The primary givens are distance rather than proximity and diffidence 
and potential conflict rather than collective action and solidarity. Nonetheless, 
there may develop some mutual concern that not every encounter between 
strangers shall end in bloodshed, enslavement or robbery. We can reasonably 
expect such concern to be especially strong among migrants and traders, or, 
more broadly, among people whose way of life depends on migration or 
trade. This can, in turn, give rise to the recognition that the ‘foreigner’ too is 
human: one can communicate, do business, treat with ‘them’. In other words: 
‘they’ are in some relevant sense ‘like us’. 
 3. The meritocratic experience. In several areas of human endeavour skilled 
performance in a given physical or intellectual craft is the primary criterion for 
judging a person’s value. Within the community of practitioners such 
professional judgements may, and frequently do, override other social and 
cultural distinctions. In such cases, the inequalities that would otherwise 
obtain are routinely ‘bracketed’ in the pursuit of excellence within the 
professional community. Those who attain a certain level of competence in a 
field may then acknowledge one another as of equal merit. Depending on the 
prestige of a particular skill or craft within the wider community such 
meritocratic judgments may underpin critiques of prevailing standards of 
inequality. 
 4. The experience of friendship and love. Love and friendship are powerful 
emotions that can only attain their full bloom in relationships between 
persons who consider one another as equals. The bonds of love and 




friendship uniting two or a small group of persons can give rise to notions of 
the ‘deal’ human relationship which contain, among other notions, ideals of 
reciprocity, mutual trust and equal dignity. At least tendentially such ideals cut 
across distinctions of rank, gender, ‘race’ and religion. Ultimately, they can 
result in models of sociability among equals, which constitute the seedbed of 
impassionate critiques of politically and culturally sanctioned modes of 
inequality. 
 5. The religious experience. Religious communities are often tightly knit 
groups, which have to survive in a hostile environment. In this, they are much 
like the groups discussed under item 1 above. However, the experiences of 
religion and mythology are not exhausted by their social embeddedness in 
definite communities; they are also the locus of highly intensive imagined 
experiences of otherworldly, or temporally and spatially remote, ‘realities’. The 
imaginary worlds conjured up by religious experience frequently encompass 
various forms of ‘imagined equality’, such as golden ages, noble savages, 
independent Amazons, the unity of mankind as created in God’s image, the 
non-materiality of the soul, and the insignificance of human hierarchy in the 
shadow of an overpowering God. Such religious experiences are as real and 
causally effective as any other type of experience. 
 6. The philosophical experience. Or perhaps I should say: the opening of 
the philosophical window on the world. For philosophy is a highly specific 
type of experience. It represents a new departure insofar as it introduces self-
reflection: a way of seeing ways of seeing (in Greek: a theory of theories; 
theooria = contemplation, sight), the emergence of self-reflexive comments on 
all the experiences mentioned above, and, finally, of comments on such 
comments. At the same time it denotes the emergence of some sort of 
intellectual community. Philosophy usually entails debate, agreement as well 
as controversy. It combines elements of the experience of friendship and 
love, the meritocratic and the religious experience: the first and the second are 
obvious; the third may need some clarification. I mean to say that philosophy, 
like religion, transcends the world of the ‘real’, and creates a new, imaginary 
world of the mind. This opens the door to the practice of critique. To see its 
relevance to broader cultural and political processes, we must realize that 
‘philosophy’ is the intensified and specialized (sometimes institutionalised) 
application of a capacity that is common to all human beings: the ability to 
reflect on their condition and to look at themselves from a third-person 
perspective. As Antonio Gramsci said in a different context: ‘all men are 




intellectuals (...) but not all men have the function of intellectuals in society’.9 
The human ability to imagine and evaluate a state of affairs different from the 
empirically given is a condition for the emergence of any concept of equality, 





The types of experience enumerated above can only subsist through shared 
languages. These languages develop over time. It follows that at any moment 
in time a community can draw on a limited repertoire of available languages. 
However, even the most limited repertoire provides at least some scope for 
semantic reshuffling and conceptual innovation. Moreover, not only 
languages change over time, so do narrative structures and literary genres. 
What terms and meanings are available and in what narratives and genres they 
can be put to use are instrumental in shaping the conditions of possibility 
(and impossibility) of discourse. 
 It is obvious that the notion of available languages and the notion of 
canonized discourses and intellectual traditions intersect in manifold ways. 
Which languages are available to a given community depends, among other 
things, on the repertoire of intellectual traditions a community can routinely 
draw upon.  
 Let me illustrate this with the theme of the frontier experience and the 
notion of common humanity in Homer and Herodotus. Both the Odyssey and 
the Histories discuss cultural difference; both contain numerous stories about 
exotic people living in remote lands. Both are written in the form of a 
narrative, and in both narratives the Greek perspective predominates. 
Herodotus is more critical to extravagant claims about mythical peoples at the 
ends of the earth, but he does not entirely discount, nor rudely debunk the 
mythical tradition, witness his treatment of the Ethiopians and the 
Amazons.10 Both Homer and Herodotus dazzle their readers with a 
kaleidoscopic panorama of ‘the (known) world’. The awareness of cultural 
difference is a defining characteristic of Odysseus, who is portrayed as the 
man who saw ‘the cities of many men and got to know their minds’, and it is 
                                                 
9 Antonio Gramsci, Gli Intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura (Rome 1975) 17. 
10 Arnaldo Momigliano, The classical foundations of modern historiography (Berkeley etc. 1990) 35 and 
Paul Veyne, Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leurs mythes? (Paris 1983). 




equally central to Herodotus’ treatise, large parts of which are presented as a 
travelogue. 
 Yet there are important differences. Homer is bound to the 
conventions of an epic genre that leaves no space for a meta-narrative 
perspective by the author. His characters’ life stories and speeches make up 
the text so that the customs of ‘others’ chiefly appear as part of Odysseus’s 
account of his experiences with them, observations of ‘whether they are cruel, 
and wild, and unjust, or whether they are kind to strangers and fear the gods 
in their thoughts’.11 By contrast, Herodotus frequently interrupts the 
narrative, offering analytical descriptions and critical discussions of ‘foreign’ 
customs, rituals and beliefs. 
   
Homer       Herodotus (484-432 BC) 
 
 Likewise, both authors acknowledge the unity of the human species, 
but in significantly different ways. All men have need of the gods, Peistratus 
declares in the Odyssey; all men must die, Homer has Athene say to 
Telemachus, and not even the gods can ward off the death of mortal men. 
Also, Alcinous recounts, ‘there is no one of all mankind who is nameless, be 
he a base man or of high standing.’12 The ‘kind’ treatment of strangers 
Odysseus refers to, and which is the major ‘international virtue’ in Homer’s 
                                                 
11 Odyssey, VIII, 573-576 and IX, 174-176. 
12 Ibidem, III, 48, 236-237 and VIII, 552-553. 




world, stands for the unwritten bond between all civilized people. In Homer’s 
work, there is a basic bond of equal respect between all humans who are not 
‘wild’. It is no accident that Homer’s exemplary ‘savages’, the Cyclopes, are 
depicted as cannibals who have no agriculture, no assemblies, no laws, and 
who ‘have no regard for one another’.13 In modern terms the Cyclopes are 
solitary hunter-gatherers who cannot understand the very idea of a common 
humanity. François Hartog has observed that the absence of agriculture and 
sociability is the chief marker of otherness in the Odyssey’s ‘poetic 
anthropology’.14 
 For Herodotus things are more complicated. The Homeric canon 
provided the backdrop to the emergence of historical inquiry. As François 
Hartog states: ‘historiography presupposed the epic. Herodotus wished to 
rival Homer; what he became, ultimately, was Herodotus.’15 The mythical 
varieties of otherness, represented by Ethiopians, Amazons, Hyperboreans 
and the like, play a role in Herodotus’ work but the elaborate anthropological 
treatises occupying most of the first four books of the Histories are concerned 
with rather more ‘historical’ folks: the Persians, the Egyptians and the 
Scythians, with shorter discussions of other peoples. 
 Like Homer, Herodotus looks at ‘the world’ from a Greek perspective, 
but in a noticeably different manner. The Greek-Persian opposition structures 
his entire narrative, and some of the commonplaces of modern orientalism, 
notably the contrast between Greek (European) freedom and Persian 
(oriental) despotism, can be traced back to him. Herodotus thus puts far more 
emphasis on the differences between the Greeks and their close neighbours 
than Homer, for whom the Greeks and the Trojans shared the same culture 
and the same gods.16 The Trojan War is not depicted as a ‘clash of 
civilizations’, while Herodotus’ Persian Wars certainly are. Homer could still 
assume, as a matter of course, that all ‘civilized people’ were roughly similar to 
the Greeks; Herodotus has lost such innocence: his anthropology, like its 
latter-day successors, is premised on difference. 
 And yet I would like to submit it also contains a new discourse of 
equality.17 Herodotus depicts the nomadic Scythians as ‘others’, but he does 
                                                 
13 Odyssey, IX, 104-115. 
14 François Hartog, Memories of Odysseus. Frontier tales from ancient Greece (Edinburgh 2001) 23-26. 
15 François Hartog, ‘The invention of history. The pre-history of a concept from Homer to 
Herodotus’, History and theory 39 (2000) 384-395, at 388. 
16 See e.g. the moving encounter between Achilles and Priam in Iliad, XXIV, 468-676. 
17 Herodotus has been portrayed as ‘the first orientalist’ by François Hartog, Le miroir d'Hérodote: 
Essai sur la représentation de l'autre (Paris 1991); James Romm, Herodotus (New Haven and London 




so in a positive, and in no way disparaging, anthropology of their culture. 
Herodotus’ lengthy discussion of them is certainly informed by a basic sense 
of their otherness, but he nonetheless makes it clear that the absence of cities 
and (partly) agriculture does not imply that Scythian society is devoid of 
meaningful patterns and practices. Instead, Herodotus considers the Scythian 
nomadic technology (mobile houses and fast moving mounted archers) ‘the 
cleverest discovery that we know.’18 In Homer, on the other hand, the ‘wild’ 
peoples are described in almost wholly negative terms: they have no 
agriculture, no laws, no agora, and no ‘regard for one another’. What is still 
more important, Herodotus is aware, as Homer is not, that others regard the 
Greeks as the Greeks regard them: ‘The Egyptians’, he relates, ‘call all men of 
other languages barbarians.’19 Darius’ famous funeral customs experiment is a 
generalisation of this observation which is finally summarised in Herodotus’ 
well-known conclusion that all men believe that their own customs are the 
best.20 Following the terrifying story of the madness of Cambyses the 
conclusion admonishes all men, but especially rulers, to respect the customs 
of others, and especially their religious beliefs: to do otherwise would be sheer 
insanity.21 Starting from the visible ‘facts’ of cultural difference, Herodotus’ 
conclusion in the end affirms sameness on a higher level of abstraction: all 
men are fundamentally alike in the way they relate to their own customs; as 
‘anthropological beings’ all men are ‘equal’. 
 To sum up: Herodotus and Homer both affirm a common humanity, 
over and above cultural difference. But Herodotus adds a critical analysis of 
the representations of cultural identity and difference by which people live, 
which could not be formulated in Homer’s epic language. This gives a critical 
edge to Herodotus’ notion of a common humanity that is lacking in Homer. 
One of the reasons is undoubtedly that Herodotus is writing against the 
                                                                                                             
1998); James Redfield, ‘Herodotus the Tourist’ in: Thomas Harisson ed., Greeks and barbarians 
(Edinburgh 2002) 24-49; see also Vivienne Gray, ‘Herodotus and the rhetoric of otherness’, 
American journal of philology 116 (1995) 185-211; recently, however, a more ‘egalitarian’ Herodotus 
has been retrieved by Rosalind Thomas, Herodotus in context. Ethnography, science and the art of 
persuasion (Cambridge 2000) and Rosaria Vignolo Munson, Telling wonders. Ethnographic and political 
discourse in the work of Herodotus (Ann Arbor 2001). 
18 Herodotus, IV, 46; on the, frequently disparaging, treatment of the Scythians by later authors, 
see James William Johnson, ‘The Scythian. His Rise and Fall’, Journal of the history of ideas 20 
(1959) 250-257. 
19 Herodotus, II, 158. 
20 Ibidem, III, 38. 
21 Rosaria Vignolo Munson, ‘The madness of Cambyses’, Arethusa 24 (1991) 43-65. 




background of the Ionian and early Sophistic philosophical tradition which 
provided him with a meta-language to speak about custom and nature.22 
 
 
Modern equality and modern inequality 
 
The above example can yield yet another insight. Homer’s utterances on 
common humanity have to be read against the backdrop of Odysseus’ tales of 
otherness and exoticism. Likewise, Herodotus’ emergent theory of the 
equality of all men, as dwellers in their own culture, is inseparable from his 
anthropological tour du monde, and in the end both are merged in Herodotus’ 
meta-narrative. The dialectic of Herodotus’ discussion of nomoi turns precisely 
on the insight that the perspectives of difference and equality presuppose and 
condition each other. This gives us an important methodological rule: a 
history of equality cannot be written without a history of inequality. It follows 
that, in order to outline the contours of a history of equality we need to 
investigate the major discourses and languages of inequality in a given 
historical period. 
 Above all, we must resist the temptation to construct an overly linear 
modernizing narrative in which ‘new’ discourses of equality invariably and 
inevitably win out against ‘old’ discourses of inequality. The temptation to 
write such a ‘Whig history of equality’ is particularly strong in modern 
European history, which has often been represented as the rise of freedom, 
equality and democracy. That is, however, only a part of a modern history 
that is also a history of economic inequality, colonial despotism, racism and 
women’s oppression. Accordingly, what we find in history is a double 
dialectic in which new discourses of equality are pitted against old as well as 
new discourses of inequality. The latter frequently arise in the same period as, 
and sometimes in response to, new discourses of equality. Moreover, in many 
cases discourses of equality and inequality are articulated as parts of one ‘body 
of knowledge’. 
 This is especially true of the Enlightenment. In his brilliant panoptic 
book, Radical enlightenment, Jonathan Israel makes a bold claim about the 
egalitarian thrust of the radical currents in the first phase of the 
Enlightenment. Beginning with Spinozism and related strands of ideas in the 
second half of the seventeenth century, Israel argues that the Radical 
Enlightenment not only secularised institutions and ideas all over Europe, but 
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it also ‘effectively demolished all legitimations of monarchy, aristocracy, 
woman’s subordination to man, ecclesiastical authority, and slavery, replacing 
these with the principles of universality, equality, and democracy.’23 Now 
Israel is surely right that the Enlightenment produced the first truly 
universalist concepts of equality. Elsewhere, I have called this ‘modern 
equality’ an abstract, universalist concept of equality that is not tied to any 
particular social or cultural context and therefore is applicable to all 
contexts.24 The egalitarian and democratic potential of such a concept is, it 
would appear, almost unlimited. 
 Israel rightly highlights the forces of creative destruction the 
protagonists of the radical Enlightenment unleashed on all the traditional 
discourses of inequality. In that field the radical application of the Cartesian 
call for ‘clear and distinct’ explanations would not leave much standing, as 
tradition was no longer a valid vehicle of legitimation. But very soon other 
foes arose to contend with. Alongside and in a continuous dialectical tension 
with the discourses of ‘modern equality’ the new human science pioneered by 
the Enlightenment spawned a 
number of powerful and 
impeccably modern discourses of 
inequality. Very soon, the multiple 
discourses of modern equality were 
confronted by a whole array of 
discourses of modern inequality, 
such as racial classification, political 
economy, a new psychobiological 
science of sexual difference, and 
finally theories of rule by a class of 
enlightened philosopher-kings 
(today’s technocracy is one of its 
offshoots). 
 
Georges Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon 
(1707-1788) 
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 An example may clarify the close intermeshing of modern discourses 
of equality and inequality. Let us take a look at a famous mid-eighteenth-
century text, Buffon’s Histoire naturelle. The chapter on ‘the varieties of the 
human species’ is almost a small book by itself: it ran to a hundred pages in 
the first edition and was later considerably expanded (Buffon worked on his 
mighty project from the 1740s to the 1780s). Apart from countless 
descriptions of particular peoples and tribes, it sets forth the outline of an 
evolutionary theory of human variation. To begin with, Buffon absolutely 
dismisses any form of polygenism. All men and women on the earth are 
members of a single species. This principle is not based on Christian 
monogenism, but on Buffon’s novel definition of a species as the ensemble of 
individuals who can interbreed and produce fertile offspring.25 How, then, to 
explain the differences in skin colour, physiognomy and bodily form between 
the ‘races’ of humanity? Here, Buffon resorts to an environmentalist 
explanation, in line with much Enlightenment thinking about psychology, 
politics and culture. His conclusion deserves to be quoted in extenso: 
 
 Tout concourt donc à prouver que le genre humain n’est pas 
composé d'espèces essentiellement différentes entre elles; qu’au 
contraire il n’y a eu originairement qu’une seule espèce d’hommes, 
qui, s’étant multipliée et répandue sur toute la surface de la terre, a 
subi différents changements par l’influence du climat, par la 
différance de la nourriture, par celle de la manière de vivre, par les 
maladies épidémiques, et aussi par le mélange varié à l’infini des 
individus plus ou moins ressemblants.26 
 
Buffon propounds a proto-Lamarckian theory of human evolution, arguing 
that the action of the same environmental influences over a long time span 
will finally produce hereditary traits, such as skin pigmentation and bodily 
form. He thinks it ‘very probable’ that such physical features will fade away 
when the environmental factors responsible for them weaken or cease to exist 
altogether. Citing the above conclusions, Buffon’s modern biographer, 
Jacques Roger, calls his theory of human variety ‘surprisingly close to the 
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thinking of modern anthropology, over and above the racial speculations of 
the nineteenth century.’27 
 There is an element of truth in Roger’s judgment, but a careful reading 
of Buffon’s entire chapter on human variety casts serious doubt on his affinity 
with the anthropology of the late twentieth century. The chapter abounds in 
utterances such as the following: ‘In Laponia and on the northern coasts of 
Tartary one encounters a race of men of small stature, a bizarre shape, of 
which the physiognomy is as savage as their customs. Those men (...) appear 
to have degenerated from the human species (...) the women are just as ugly 
as the men, and resemble them so much that one does not distinguish them 
at first.’28 Generally, Buffon discusses the America’s and their inhabitants in 
terms of ‘degeneration’.29 About the Africans he has this to say: ‘Although the 
negroes have little intelligence, they do not lack powerful sentiments; they are 
happy or downcast, industrious or lazy, friends or enemies, depending on the 
way in which one treats them.’30 This is followed by an ambiguous comment 
on the slave trade. Buffon is ‘revolted’ by the odious practice of slavery, 
engendered by cruelty and greed, but he does not formulate a wholesale 
condemnation of it, and the passage ends in a resigned finale: ‘Mais laissons 
ces hommes durs [the slave owners], et revenons à notre objet’.31 On the 
other hand, Buffon is well aware of the relativity of European racial 
aesthetics. Speaking about the inhabitants of the Cape Verdean islands he 
observes that they are strong and well built and ‘very black’; the Cape 
Verdeans, he further relates, ‘believe that their country is the best and the 
most beautiful on the earth, and that they themselves are the most beautiful 
people in the world because they are the blackest.’32 It is not easy to 
determine if the last utterance is meant ironically or not. 
 Ultimately, Buffon’s text continually navigates between the notion of a 
common humanity and concrete descriptions of lands and peoples that point 
in a diametrically opposite direction. In a few sentences he moves from a 
stereotypical discourse on the low intelligence and naivety of the ‘negroes’ to 
censorious observations about the slave trade, only to leave the reader 
hanging in mid-air. Likewise, Buffon’s concept of the human species vacillates 
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between a notion of the thinking mind as the hallmark of humanity, 
philosophically grounded on Cartesian dualism, and a more materialist 
approach, suggested by the inclusion of humanity in a ‘natural history’ where 
it is investigated and classified as a part of the animal kingdom.33 The 
Cartesian theorisation of the human person has powerful egalitarian 
implications, while the natural-historical approach puts the main emphasis on 
ethnic (racial) classification and physical differences. 
 Both the science of racial classification (‘n’en déplaise Jacques Roger’) 
and the notion of the equality of all human beings as members of the same 
species are powerfully present in Buffon’s text. Or, to put it more generally, 
both modern equality and modern inequality partake in the making of his 
argument. To ask ‘who is the real Buffon?’ makes no sense, for the only 
possible answer would be: both. 
 What is demonstrated here through Buffon’s work applies to countless 
other cases and themes: the discourses of modern, universalistic equality are 
always doubled by equally modern discourses of inequality. And this is not 
only true of intellectually sophisticated texts, but also of popular stories and 
pictorial representations of equality and difference. To remain with the 
classification of humanity for a moment: schoolchildren may be taught the 
unity of humanity as Christian doctrine and scientific truth, but what of the 
iconography of difference represented by the countless pictures and displays 
of ‘other peoples’ these same children have been confronted with in 
classrooms, museums and exhibitions during the last two or three centuries?34 
Do not these convey a quite different message? 
 
 
Conclusion: equality as a Janus-faced concept 
 
In all history, but in particular in modern history, equality is a Janus-faced 
concept. One face bespeaks its overwhelming power. At the present time, it is 
inscribed in democratic constitutions the world over, as well as in the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights. In today’s world, there seems to be a 
near-universal consensus that equality is one of the basic values of a good 
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society.35 The other face of the egalitarian Janus, however, shows us an 
embattled and contested idea: the everlasting ‘yes-but’ concept of modern 
history. Whether one discusses ‘races’ and nations, economic, knowledge or 
gender issues, arguments for and against equality abound, and ever novel and 
different concepts and images of equality and inequality emerge from the 
contest. The history of equality is situated in the discursive space between the 
two faces of the Janus. Much of it, perhaps most of it, remains to be written. 
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